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Abstract: Optimal price regulation for natural and legal monopolies is an
impossible task. The still difficult .task of good price regulation can be
systematized by considering separately price level and price structure of
the regulated firm. Various methods of price level and price structure
regulation are evaluated and then considered for the regulation ofelectric
ity transmission, both in the context of an independent transmission
company and ofvertical integration between transmission and most ofthe
generation capacity. The regulatory approach suggested uses price caps
defined on two-part tariffs. This way, flexibility for short-term capacity
utilization can be combined with incentives for investments in new trans
mission capacity.
Resumen: La regulación óptima de precios para monopolios naturales y
legales es una tarea imposible. La aún dificil tarea de una adecuada
regulación del precio puede ser sistematizada considerando separada
mente el nivel yla estructura del precio de la empresaregulada. Se evalúan
diversos métodos de regulación del nivel y la estructura de precios y
posteriormente se les considera para regular la transmisión de electricidad
tanto en el contexto de una compañía de transmisión independiente como
en el de la integración vertical entre transmisión y la mayor parte de la
capacidad de generación. El enfoque regulatorio sugerido utiliza precios
máximos definidos como tarifas en dos partes. De estaforma, la flexibilidad
para la utilización de la capacidad de corto plazo puede combinarse con
incentivos para inversiones en nueva capacidad de transmisión.
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1. Introduction
In a way, the titie ofthis paper is an anachronism. Consider the first
three words, “optirnal price regulation”. Until about 1970, rnany of
us believed in truly optirnal or first best regulation, which meant
marginal cost prices. However, over time, the adjective “optimal” has
received more and more qualifications. The first was that losses in
curred under optimal prices in the presence of economies of scale led
to seconci best Ramsey pricing, which peaked around 1980. The main
insight here was that prices should deviate from marginal cost prices
by markups that are inversely proportional to demand elasticities (or,
more precisely, to super-elasticities). The deficiency of Ramsey prices
was the regulator’s lack of information about cost and dernand func
tions. Thus, the next wave was third best regulation under incomplete
information. The main insights frorn this wave were that regulated
firms might need to be able to make econornic profits in order to reveal
private information and that such profits can be limited by givingfirms
a choice from a menu ofregulatory options. This wave probably peaked
with the publication ofthe Laffont and Tirole (1993) book on incentive
regulation. What is the next step away from optimal price regulation?
Is itfourth best regulation that makes theoretical modeis ofregulation
applicable under political and practicality constraints? In any case,
regulation economistshave moved further and further awayfromwhat
was once perceived as optimal price regulation. Consequently, in order
to be relevant, the price regulation mechanisms we consider here are
not strictly optimal in that they maximize a well-defined social welfare
function. Rather, the schemes are rneant for practical application and
thus should have sorne desirable properties. The desirable properties
are two in particular. First, in order to be implementable, price regu
lation should be viewed as fair, meaning that it makes no important
group significantly worse offthan the status quo. Second, and closely
related, there has to be an efficiency improvernent.’
Now consider the remainder of the titie, “natural and legal
monopolies”. For the last few years, the decline oflegal monopolies has
been a worldwide phenomenon. Competition (often accompanied by
1 In this paper, we are totaliy neglecting environmental issues, implicitly assuming that
they are taken care of through other policies that are reflected in a reguiated firm’s costs. In
principie, we could have inciuded environmental policy in output pricing. Phis would be
appropriate if the output caused direct environmental harms.
privatization) has been introduced in traditional monopoly sectors,
such as telecommunications and electricity supply. There has been a
similar decline in the reported incidence ofnatural monopoly in these
sectors. Only niches of natural and, in sorne cases, legal monopolies
remain. Examples could include local telephone companies, gas distri
bution cornpanies, electricity distribution and transmission compa
nies. In spite ofthis decline, why might it nevertheless be worthwhile
to cast a new lookat the regulation ofthese rnonopolies in light oflirnits
to optimal regulation? Ah the aboye examples have in common that
they belong to industries with potentially competitive parts that are
vertically related to these monopolies. In the energy sector, electricity
transrnission and distribution have strong monopoly attributes, while
generation is potentially competitive. Natural gas and oil pipelines
and gas distribution companies are potential monopolies, while
gas and oil production could be competitive. Thus, rnonopoly regula
tion today almost inevitably has to be seen in the context of related
competitive industries. Furthermore, the rnonopolists often are verti
cally integrated so that they either hold a monopoly over ah stages or
compete with firms that use the monopoly outputs as their inputs.
In the following, we will first treat the monopoly price regulation
problem in a generic fashion, separating the problems of price level
and price structure. Then we will concentrate on energy industries in
a mixed monopoly/competitive setting, firstwithout then withvertical
integration. The paper takes electricity transmission as the main
example. becauseit raisesthe most complexissues. It is fairlystraight
forward to move from here to natural gas and oil pipelines, or to
electricity and gas distribution companies.
2. Price Level Regulation
Price regulation is best discussed separatelyforthe level and structure
of prices (see Brown et al., 1991). The reasons are that level and
structure address somewhat different issues and that different types
ofregulation are available for each. Theprice structure predominantly
deals with short-run allocation of existing plant and with the distri
bution of benefits between different custorner groups. In contrast,
price level regulation has a longer-run perspective and deals with
distribution ofrisks and net benefits between custorners overail and
the regulated firm. The latter is known as rent extraction. Equally
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important, price level regulation is decisive for the regulated firm’s
incentives for cost minimization. 2
We begin with price level regulation. The options to be discussed
are conventional rate-of-return regulation, price caps (based on in
dexed adjustments), yardstick regulation and profit sharing with
consumers. We finish the section with remarks on giving regulated
firms a choice from a menu of options.
2.1. Rate-of-return Regulation
Most U. S. electricity regulators currently practice rate-of-return
regulation. Under rate-of-return regulationthe firm’s prescribed price
level changes only if the firm’s realized rate of return on capital
deviates from an allowed rate of return. Thus, at least in theory,
rate-of-return regulation is fully cost based. It fairly distributes cost
reductions and cost increases between customers and the regulated
firm, but would provide little incentives for cost reductions. Such
incentives only come from “imperfections” in the practice ofrate-of-re
turn regulation. Two imperfections stand out. The first imperfection
is that the allowed rate ofreturn usually exceeds the cost of capital.
As a result, regulated firms may have some interest in selling more
output than an unconstrained monopolist but may also want to use
inefficient input combinations (theAverch-Johnson effect). The second
imperfection is that rate cases are costly and time consuming, result
ing in a regulatory lag. During such a lag the firm can reap rewards
from efficiency improvements and has to bear the burdens from
inefficiency. Rate-of-return regulation will provide incentives for in
creased efficiency, for example, ifthe environment is stable (no infla
tion, no technical change, and no changes in interest rates). Under
such circumstances regulatory lag will be long, giving the transmis
sion company time to improve efficiency. The lag has, however, caused
problems in adapting prices to changing environments, something
that in the past came close to regulatory expropriation of electric
utilities when input prices changed drastically (Joskow and MacA
voy, 1975).
2 The distinction between price level regulation and price structure regulation is related
to the Laffont and Tirole (1993) “incentive-pricing dichotomy”. Ifthis dichotomy holds, allocative
pricing problems can be separated from cost-reducing incentives.
Because rate-of-return regulation is critically dependent on the
rate base (thevalue ofthe firm’s assets), the regulatorhas to scrutinize
the firrn’s capacity investments. In the last few years U. S. regulators
have questioned and successfully denied cost overruns or entire in
vestrnents in the rate base. While an efficiency rationale can be given
to this type ofregulatory behavior (Gilbert and Newbery, 1988; Lyon,
1991) it does raise rnoral-hazard issues and increases regulatory
uncertainty. As a result, theoretical models generating overinvest
ment under rate-of-return regulation may no longer be applicable (if
they ever were). A potential underinvestrnent problem holds true in
particular for investrnents with high cost risks to begin with, e.g., nu
clear power plants.
Summing up, rate-of-return regulation provides weak incentives
for cost minimization. On the positive side, rate-of-return regulation
in the U. S. has evolved frorn a fairness doctrine that has provided it
with substantial comrnitrnent power. 3
2.2. Price-cap Regulation
Price-cap regulation was invented as an alternative to rate-of-return
regulation that would provide steep incentives for cost minimization
by making regulated prices independent ofthe costs ofthe regulated
firrn. At the same time, risks from exogenous cost changes would be
limited by an adjustment formula. Under price-cap regulation the
firrn’s price level has to rernain at or below a cap that moves over time,
at an exogenously determined rate. The formula for this rate usually
contains three distinct elernents:
1) An adjustment factor for the econorny’s price level. This infla
tion adjustment can be seen as representing the firm’s unspecified
input prices or, more likely, the inflationary loss ofconsumers.
2) One or several adjustment factors for specific inputs or cost
iterns that are passed through to consumers. These include sorne tax
With ah its drawbacks rate-of-return regulation, in the U. S., has to be considered a
serious alternative to any form of incentive regulation. The reason is that (based, inter alia, on
the 1944 Hope decision by the U. S. Supreme Court) regulated firms (and possibly customers)
can always induce regulators or courts to revert to rate-of-return regulation if incentive
regulation deviates substantially from rates of return that simply cover cost of capital. This is
something where other countries would differ substantiahly from the United States.
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and fuel adjustments. Besides for price changes of equipment, con
struction and labor, the major question for capital-intensive firms is
“Should there be a price adjustment for economy-wide interest rate
changes?” Such an interestrate adjustmentwould be entirelydifferent
from rate-of-return regulation because it would follow interest rate
changes by simple formula (e.g., linked to the prime rate). Such an
adjustment makes sense even if part of the firm’s debt carnes fixed
interest rates, because the firm’s overail opportunity cost ofcapital is
variable.
3) A general productivity adjustment factor, X. This would, ordi
narily, reflect forward-looking productivity improvements, coming
from technical change, economies of scale and adherence to cost
minimization. Such improvements can be projected based on long-run
trends from the past and from knowledge of the relevant technology.
Contrary to telecommunications, the energy industries have not seen
consistent long-run productivity trends that would lend support to
positive leveis ofX. In a move from rate-of-return regulation to price
caps it may, however, be appropriate to add a “consumer dividend” of,
say, .5% to anXfactor that is based on historic productivity data. The
U. S. Federal Communications Commission (Fcc) has, for example,
done this, when introducing price-cap regulation for AT&T in 1989,
arguing that price caps would provide incentives for productivity
improvements that should be shared with customers.
The first two factors should be designed in such a way that they
cannot be influenced by the firm but together correlate closely with
the firm’s overali input price level. If, in addition, theXfactor provides
a realistic assessment ofthe firm’s productivity change over time, then
the price cap will trace the firm’s overail cost level. Although the
price-cap formula adjusts for external cost and demand changes that
a regulated firm may experience, cumulative deviations from normal
profits could, over time, reach positive or negative magnitudes unac
ceptable to the regulator. This would happen because: a) not all cost
factors are covered, b) external developments differ from firm-specific
cost factors, and c) the X factor is at best a forecast for productivity
changes. As a result, price cap formulas need to be revised every few
years (or deregulation has to occur). These revisions tend to be based
on the firm’s achieved and expected rate of return. Hence, price-cap
regulation is often viewed as similar to rate-of-return regulation,
however, with a longer and pre-specified regulatory lag.
To summarize, the strong incentive effects of the price-cap for
mula for cost minimization are, in practice, limited by the necessity to
contain distributionary effects and to prevent extreme rent transfers.
2.3. Yardstick Regulation
Under yardstick regulation the firm’s price level is capped with refe
rence to some yardstick. The yardstick can be an efficient cost level,
such as long-run average incremental costs (the TSLRIC or TELRIC used
by the FCC 4 — or benchmark costs used in Chile for electricity regula
tion) or the average level of costs achieved or of prices charged by
comparable firms in the same industry.
The FCC approach of cost estimation is very tedious for network
industries, in which investment costs depend very much on local
circumstances. It is far too tedious for annual price adjustments but
may bejustified on a one-time basis, for starting prices.
Cost comparisons with other firms as the basis for yardstick
regulation would allow the regulatorto provide optimal incentives and
leave the regulated firms no rents, to the extent that these firms face
similar demand and cost functions and are subject to the same random
shocks as the regulatedfirm. The problem is that regulated firms, even
in narrow sectors, such as electricity transmission, can face vastly
different demand and cost functions (for example, due to different
terrain) and can be subject to idiosyncratic shocks. Yardstick regula
tion then loses its effectiveness in providing incentives and in limiting
firm rents. 5 For example, a firm with very unfavorable cost conditions
may be unable to finance investments ifit can onlycharge prices based
on firms with average conditions. Conversely, a firm with very favor
able cost conditions may be able to reap excessive profits. Neverthe
less, yardstick regulation may be the right approach, for example, if
regulators have limited data sources. For example, in 1997, the Euro-
pean Commission recommended interconnection charges for tele-
TsLRIC stands for total service long-run incremental cost and TELRIC for total element
long-run incremental cost. See scc (1996).
Part of the cost differences between firms can be eliminated through econometric
analysis. Econometric estimates can, for example, eliminate the effects ofnetwork density or of
regional wage differences. There remain, however, many unexplained differences other than
those relating to firm efficiency. Phis can create fairness issues if the firm is rewarded or
penalized for such non-efficiency related differences.
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phone companies based onthe averageinterconnection charges ofOECD
countries with the lowest such charges. The reason for this procedure
was that domestic cost data on interconnection were not readily
available to national regulators in the European Union. At the same
time, there was the presumption that efficient costs ofinterconnection
would not differ substantially across industrialized countries. Thus,
when using yardstick regulation regulators face a tradeoff between
their own ability to measure benchmark costs and the potentially
serious distributional issues that arise when other firms are used as
yardsticks. Ifthe own abilities for cost measurement are limited and
if costs/prices of other firms are deemed similar to those of the
regulated firm then those other firrns can be used as a yardstick.
2.4. Profit-sharing (Sliding Scale) Regulation
Under price caps and yardstick regulation the regulated price level
depends onvariables outside the firm’s influence. This provides strong
incentives, but may provide outcomes that are perceived as unfair.
Having consumers share the firm’s profits addresses this fairness
issue and, at the same time, provides at least sorne incentives for cost
reduction. In this case, the firm’s price level is adjusted by a specified
profit share times the achieved rate ofreturn on the firm’s revenues.
Since profits first have to be measured, the adjustment occurs with
one period lag. Thus, if the firm’s economic profit this period is it, its
revenues are R and the sharing parameter is s, then the firm has to
reduce its prices next period on average by a factor of sit/R. 6 The
beauty of profit sharing is that, in an ex-post view, it treats the
customers as shareholders ofthe company while, seen ex ante, it is a
sharing of risk and an incentive device for the firm. For sufficiently
short lag periods, the larger s, the smaller the incentive ofthe firm to
reduce costs and the srnaller the risk faced by the firm. With s
approaching 1 the firm can keep any excess profits for only one period
but also has to face losses only for one period. In this case profit sharing
approaches cost-plus regulation without the ‘plus’. With s vanishing,
6 Technically, profit sharing is often achieved by making the shares depend on achieved
rates ofreturn relative to target rates ofreturn. The sharing parameter s may then itselfdepend
on the amount ofdeviation from the target rate ofreturn. In practice, the sharing is often set at
100% ifrates ofreturn are aboye and below certain threshold leveis. Profit sharing is rarely done
by direct payments to consumers because those raise fairness and moral hazard issues.
profit sharing approaches total deregulation ofprices or pure price-cap
regulation (with an infinite regulatory lag). For O <s < 1 profit-shar
ing regulation has a nurnber ofinteresting properties.
First, in a changing environment profit sharing, due to its lagged
application, has sornewhat erratic long-run dynamic effects on prices
and financial perforrnance. For example, a one-time cost reduction
would lead to a simultaneous profit increase. Sharingthis profit means
that consumers receive a price reduction in the next period which,
because costs are back to the old level, lead to a loss at that time. This
loss then triggers a price increase next period, but not by the fuli
amount. Profits would be converging frorn below to zero profits over
time. Compare this to a permanent cost reduction, which will lead to
a one-tirne profit increase, followed by a gradual price and profit
reduction over time. If several cost and demand changes occur simul
taneously or in short order there will be compound effects that can be
hard to predict. These effects decline over time, with the speed of
reduction depending on the profit share. However, there may be sorne
risk oflong-terrn losses to the firm. This specifically holds for inflation,
which the firrn may never catch up with. That is why customers may
have to share 100% of ah losses (after sorne lag period), or profit-shar
ing regulation may have to be combined with some adjustment for
mula for inflationary or input price changes.
Second, in terms of cornmitrnent power profit sharing may out
perform other types of incentive regulation because of its built-in
fairness and self-correction. The regulated firm is allowed to keep only
part ofits profits from windfall or superior efficiency; and consumers
almost imrnediately share in the benefits. Consumers, therefore, can
be happy about large profits because those trigger subsequent large
price reductions. However, the lack of fuli loss sharing could induce
regulated firms to revert to rate-of-return regulation.
Third, profit sharing can have similar incentive power to price
caps, depending on the length of the regulatory period and on the
sharing parameter. A major difference, however, is that, under price
caps, there is no adjustment for profit changes before the review period
and then there is likely to be a large or fuhi adjustment while, under
profit sharing, there is a partial adjustment in each period. Through
the compounding effect of profit sharing the incentive for cost reduc
tions is reduced by more than the share parameter (up to 100%, ifthe
discount rate is zero and the cost reduction only lasts one period).
Fourth, if profit sharing is applied every period it has high
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administrative costs because each time it resembles a rate-of-return
rate case.
Thus, overali profit sharing has the advantage ofpopularity but
carnes major incentive and financial problems, unless losses are
shared 100% by customers.
2.5. Menus
Our discussion oftypes ofprice level regulationhas revealedthat none
ofthem is ideal, but that different mechanisms succeed or fail under
different circumstances. The question is if hybrid schemes can make
up for deficiencies by building on the strengths of individual mecha
nisms and avoiding their weaknesses.
What runs under the name of price-cap regulation, as it is
practiced in several countries for electricity and in many U. S. states
for telecommunications, is already such a hybrid in that it combines
aspects of rate-of-return regulation, profit sharing, yardstick regula
tion and pure price caps.
One reason why single schemes are not ideal is that regulated
firms hoid private information that they can use to bend the effects of
a particular scheme to their advantage. The regulator can make use
ofthis tendency by offering firms menus consisting ofcombinations of
schemes. The regulated firm will then select the scheme from the
menu that is most adequate for it in that it maximizes expected profits
among all schemes on the menu. The type of menu most commonly
suggested consists of various blends between price caps and profit
sharing. The firm could then choose between different X factors and
profit shares, s, of consumers. The larger the X factor, the smaller
the profit share ofconsumers would be. For example, X = 0% could be
associated with s = 100%,X = 1% with s = 80%, and so on, untilX = 5%
and s = 0%. The rationale is that a firm that expects to gain a lot in
productivity would be more willing to commit to a high X. Thus, the
most efficient type offirm would selfselect into the steepest incentive
scheme (Laffont and Tirole, 1993).
In practice, menus are difficult to design and it is hard to set the
rightparameters. Also, customers tend to be unhappy about the choice
from the menu made by the firm.
3. Price Structure Regulation
Disputes about the type of price-structure regulation arise with re
spect to consumer groups and a regulated firm’s competitors. Con
sumer groups generally want the regulated firm to charge low prices
for them relative to others, while the regulated firm’s competitors
want the firm to charge high prices in the markets where they
compete. Under monopoly regulation there are no such competitors.
However, for example in electricity, some generation and distribution
companies or large industrial consumers are able to bypass the public
transmission network. These potential bypassers may compete with
other firms that cannot bypass the network. In this case they may
want the transmission company to charge high prices so that they can
bypass the network whereas their competitors cannot. If the price
structure is heavily (cross-) subsidized incentives for entry or bypass
may be created or enhanced, thus stranding investments by regulated
firms.
The four types of regulating the monopolist’s price level that we
discussed aboye can be combined with several different types of
regulating its price structure. We briefly consider three main types:
• Fully distributed cost pricing
• Price bands
• Flexible price structures
3.1. Fully Distributed Cost Pricing
Cost attribution formulas determine price structures by distributing
the costs of the firm among its outputs and then making price struc
tures depend on the costs thus allocated. This is usually known as fully
distributed cost pricing. There are many ways to distribute not di
rectly assignable costs among outputs, which makes this procedure
very arbitrary (Braeutigam, 1980). However, it does have a long
traditionin accounting and regulation and therefore is often the status
quo againstwhich new suggestions have to be measured. Inparticular,
rate-of-return regulation has traditionally been associated with fully
distributed cost pricing.
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3.2. Price Bands
Bands with upper and lower price limits allow the firm sorne limited
flexibility in changing its price structure while giving consumers
assurances that they are protected from large price increases.
Numerically prespecifiedbands are routinely used in the U. S. for
the regulation of access prices of the local telephone companies. In
contrast to complete flexibility in the price structure, the regulator can
cornmit more easily to prespecified bands. In the case ofmonopolists,
lower limits are probably unnecessary because predatory pricing is of
little concern. However, bands may provide assurances that specific
customers are not favored by the monopolist.
Economically specified bands are defined by economically mean
ingful upper and lower limits on prices. Antitrust economists usually
argue for stand-alone costs as an upper limit and incremental costs as
a lower limit, based on cross subsidization and competition consider
ations. Prices aboye stand-alone costs subsidize others and could never
be maintained indefinitely with free entry. Prices below incremental
costs are subsidized by others and would never be maintained indefi
nitely by a profit-maximizing firm (and could not be maintained by a
multiproduct firm in contestable markets). Although these upper and
lower bounds are economically compelling and appear to have fairness
acceptance, they suffer from measuring problems for both incremental
and stand-alone costs. That is precisely why such bands appear to be
more relevant for antitrust than regulation. Such bands would also
be important for any prices that remain outside ofregulation (e.g., for
optional prices discussed below) and for the regulation of integrated
utilities that face competition on one level.
3.3. Flexible Price Structures
Complete flexibility in the price structure sounds like lack of regula
tion. It is, however, in practice severely lirnited by price-level regu
lation. If the firrn has to stay on or below a regulated price level
it is limited to price structures with which it at least breaks even.
This choice ofprice structure obviously becomes more constrained the
tighterthe constraint onthe price level. An unconstrained profit-maxi
mizing monopoly firm will irnplement an efficient price structure,
though at an inefficientlyhigh level. By providing the right constraint
on the firm’s price level (in the form of a price index) regulation can
benefit from the firm’s natural tendency toward an optimal price
structure. This is what price cap regulation is trying to make use of.
However, fairness concerns or other than efficiency concerns may
impose additional constraints on the firm’s flexibility to choose its
price structure.
The freedom of price structure can be restricted through the
introduction ofbaskets. Each basket contains a subset of services for
which a specific price level has to be maintained while, within the
services ofa basket, the price structure may be flexible. Thus, the price
structure between baskets tends to be rigid. In the case ofelectricity
transmission separate baskets could, for example, refer to native loads
and third party loads, or they could refer to different zones.
Flexibility for optional prices allows the firm to offer consumers
(nonlinear) price options in addition to regulated prices. Thus, there
could exist a regulated price structure along with an unregulated
optional price structure. Since each customer has the option always to
buy at the regulatedprices, customers would beprotected. Atthe same
time the firm can increase its sales and its customer base through
attractive offerings. This could become important for a regulated firm
faced with bypass. While optional prices appear to be ideal for final
(i.e., residential) consumers, they may carry problems for commercial
customers that compete with each other. For a commercial consumer
it may actually be bad ifan optional price is offered that is attractive
for its rival but not for itself, because that might deteriorate its
competitive position. Another problem of optional pricing can come
from incentives for quality deterioration. The regulated firm may offer
an optional tariffand, at the same time, deteriorate the quality under
the regulated tariff. To avoid this, quality monitoring and guarantees
may have to be part ofthe regulated tariff.
7 Optional pricing also affects the firm’s price level. Ifoptional prices are kept outside the
price-cap level the actual quantities traded atregulated prices may becomeirrelevant as weights.
In contrast, if optional prices are included they will have a feedback effect on regulated prices.
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4. Regulation ofElectricity Transmission
4.1. Specifics ofElectricity Transmission
The traditional electric utility setup has been one of vertically inte
grated monopolies that provide generation, transmission and distri
bution services. The modern view is that competition in generation is
feasible and desirable and that distribution should occur in locally
separated monopolies. In contrast, transmission should either be
provided by independent regional transmission companies (risco’s),
or the grid should be leased to an independent system operator (Iso),
who would be in charge of network coordination and generation
dispatch. Since wewant to concentrate on the monopoly regulationas
pect, we consider the TRANSCO approach. This fairly neatly separates
monopoly from competitive issues. After an extensive analysis ofthis
case in the current section, we will, in Section 5, look at the case of a
vertically integrated generation and transmission company that faces
competition in generation.
What makes regulation of transmission networks particularly
challenging is to set incentives in such a way that the transmission
network ideally complements generation and distribution. This in
dudes minimizing distances between power stations and demand
centers for competitive alternatives, providing system reliability (fre
quency and voltage leveis), smoothing load patterns, coordinating
maintenance of power plants and providing emergency responses
(Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983). Ah this has to be achieved for a
commodity that is exceedingly hard to cost out.
TRANSCO’S through their investment and pricing influence the
amount of electricity transmitted through their network. For given
investment their total costs are largely sunk, making capacity utiliza
tion their major short-run problem. Their major long-run problem is
optimal investment, optimizing over the amount of expansion and
minimizing costs ofinvestment. Three issues need to be addressed in
particular. First, transmission is a complicated service with severe
externality problems that can at least be partially internalized by
having a monopoly provider. Second, transmission networks exhibit
economies of scale and lumpiness. Third, the main “variable costs” of
transmission come in the form of power losses and congestion costs
(which are opportunity costs). O&M expenditures vary little with
usage (although inappropriate usage could lead to system break
downs). Thus, the TRANSCO’s variable costs are associated with hardly
any expenses (unless it is responsible for making up power losses).
4.2. Suggested Price Level Regulation
Rate-of-return and yardstick regulation of TRANSCO’S look quite unat
tractive. The cost minimization issues in transmission networks are
probably too location specific to be handied by regulators as outside
cost controllers and to provide yardsticks (on the basis ofcost modeis
or average costs ofthe industry). Thus, incentives from cost-monitor
ingunder rate-of-return regulation and from industry-wide yardsticks
are unlikely to be feasible in the case of a transmission company.
However, rate-of-return regulation may have some crucial functions
for initiating the price level and for long-run revisions.
For TRANSCO’S we are thus left with price caps or profit sharing.
We suggest a hybrid scheme, based predominantly on price caps.
The transmission price level cruciafly influences TRANSCO invest
ment. First, in order to invest, the TRANSCO has to expect a rate of
return on this investment covering the cost of capital. Second, trans
mission investment is riskybecause transmission links are lumpy and
long lived and therefore the TRANSCO has to assess demand for trans
mission services overdistantfutures. This suggeststhat the price level
has to contain either a buifer to accommodate risks or flexibility to
adjust for risks ex post on short notice. A buffer can be built into the
X-factor while flexibihity in the short run comes from the cost adjust
ment and in the long run from rate reviews every few years.
Regulation ofprice leveis would occur in three steps. First, initial
prices need to be determined. Second, price leveis wihlbe adaptedevery
period (if necessary and appropriate). Third, price levels wihl be
reviewed every few years.
Regulation would begin with a determination ofstarting prices,
usually the prices ruling before the introduction ofthe new regulatory
regime. Such prices may not exist for transmission services, and, if
they do, they are unlikely to be satisfactory starting prices for a
‘nlsco. Thus, such prices need to be estabhishedwithreference either
to efficient prices (e.g., level equal to long-run average incremental
costs ofexpanding transmission capacity by a substantial lump) or to
a target rate ofreturn on historic costs. Sehecting starting prices can
be a complicated undertaking. The total embedded costs ofa transmis
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sion system are easily determined. However, it is hard to transiate
these into a sensible starting price structure. One way to achieve a
price structure is to distribute the embedded costs over kWhtransmit
ted in a base period and over kW generation or load capacity on
the grid. The problem, however, is to find correct percentages for the
division between the two assignment methods. In principie, the costs as
signed to kWh should reflect expected congestion costs and the costs
assigned to kW the residual.
Subsequent periodic changes in price leveis would, under our
preferred approach, be ruled by a price-cap formula adjustingforinput
price changes (capital goods, labor and interest rates) and a produc
tivity commitrnentX. For electricitytransmission companies with few
cost items that could be linked to the current level ofinflation andwith
servicesthat are not purchased directly by households needingprotec
tion frorn inflation, a general inflation adjustment might be inappro
priate, although it is easily understood and implementable. As a result
of computerization and increased electricity trade, sorne productivity
improvements of transmission companies through better capacity
utilization can be expected over time. However, it is hard to find
empirical evidence in favor of a productivity-based X substantially
aboye 0. The X factor should be on the order of 0-3%, reflecting a
consurner dividend.
The price-cap review after, say, five years could use a rate-of-re
turn approach, but should have both a backward-looking and a for
ward-looking component. For fairness reasons, sorne custorner profit
sharing for the past five years could come in if no consumer dividend
was built into the X factor. This profit sharing could take the forrn of
a limited one-time rebate, a one-time adjustment in the price level
or an adjustrnent in the X factor. For efficiency reasons, the new X
factor should otherwise be based rnainly on the future possibilities of
the firm.
4.3. Suggested Price-structure Regulation
4.3.1. Two-part Tariffs
Transmission pricing is the perfect case for the following conundrurn.
In the short run, the goal is optimal capacity utilization, something
that can be done under sophisticated pricing that involves a large
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amount of (partially private) information and reflects the cost of
congestion to users. Because offluctuating and inelastic demand, such
pricing rnay lead to revenues that are unrelated to the capital cost of
capacity. In particular, severe congestion can be highly profitable for
the TRANSCO. Thus, the TRANSCO may have too little incentive to invest
when new capacity is most needed; and the incentives for optimal
capacity utilization and optirnal investrnent are hard to coordinate.
Optimalinvestmentwould meanthatinvestment occurs atthe margin
when the marginal cost per unit ofnew capacity equals the expected
congestion cost arising frorn not adding that unit.
How can the tension between optimal capacity utilization and
optimal investment be overcome in a price regulation scheme? We are
looking for regulated prices that are flexible enough in their struc
ture to allow for efficient capacity utilization, yet will generate stable
enough revenues to support capacity costs. They should also provide
incentives to invest precisely when capacity utilization is getting too
high. To achieve this, we suggest a two-part pricing to the price-cap
index. 8
Under this approach, the Transco could charge an average tariff
that would follow the price-cap level by declining, for example,X% per
year in real terms. The average would be defined as a price index with
quantity weights. 9 The index would be defined on a set of fixed fees
and variable fees. The basic idea is that optimal capacity utilization
can be reached through the variable fee, while the incentive to invest
can be captured in a combination ofrevenues from the variable tariff
plus fixed fees. The background is that capital costs of capacity are
steady while congestion costs are highly erratic. Thus, total revenues
need to be fairly steady and reflect the influence ofcapital costs, while
the part ofrevenues coming from current operation should reflect the
ups and downs in capacity utilization. This can be done by creating a
tradeoff between utilization tariffs and fixed tariffs. To achieve this,
the price-cap index simply has to be a price index defined overtwo-part
tariffs. In the sirnplest case, the quantity sold under a fixed fee is the
number of custorners buying under this fee.
8 The formula can be appliedjust as weII to other forms ofprice-level regulation, provided
the price level is high enough to support investment.
Such an index would have the form PI
= If it is a chained Laspeyres
index with previous period’s quantities as weights it can also be written as
PI =p/p l)(pvqiw/jzpvq,w)
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Basically, whenever the TR&NSCO increases its utilization tariffs
as a resuit of congestion, it has to reduce the fixed fee accordingly.
Incentives for efficient behavior are induced by using quantities for
transmission services as weights for the variable fees so that total
revenues (and resulting profits) will be higher the more efficient are
capacity utilization and capacity expansion (i.e., capacity utilization
in the short and in the long run).
4.3.2. Variable Fees
The variable fees take care of the short term pricing issues of the
TRMJSCO. In particular, they could cover congestion costs, power losses
and ancillary services. The variable fees could take simple or sophis
ticated forms. In that sense, the suggested regulatory approach is
compatible with any desired transmission pricing approach ofregula
tors and firms. Under a simple approach, the TRANSCO would set
variable fees ex ante. For example, there could be peak and off-peak
rates for different zones. Once the TRANSCO sets those rates, theywould
determine the level of fixed fees (following the price-cap formula).
Within a given price-cap level the price structure could then be
changed on short notice. For example, if fixed fees are paid on a
monthly basis, the TRANSCO could also change its fee schedule monthly
with, say, 15 days notice. This way, regulation could accommodate
changes in demand and supply conditions.
A sophisticated approach would be spot pricing (Schweppe et al.,
1988). In this case, the variable fees might change almostinstantaneo
usly and could differ geographically, for example, by nodes or zones.
At the variable fees it charges, the TRANSCO would then have an
obligation to serve. So, there would be no non-price rationing. In this
scenario fixed fees could not be set ex ante. Because ofcongestion, spot
prices would fluctuate and, by definition, be unknown ex ante. The
fixed fee would therefore have to be determined at the end of the pe
riod. These within-period adjustments, which make the TRANSCO fulfili
the price-cap constraint, can be interpreted as premia and penalties.
If there is too much congestion in a period the variable fee will
automatically adjust upwards (to equate supply and demand) and
therefore the TRANSCO will have to reduce fixed fees (across the board).
Thus, the TRANSCO wouid be penalized for congestion. If there is less
than expected congestion the variable fees will be lower than expected
and hence fixed fees will be increased, generating a premium for the
ANsco. Becausepnces staywithin averages, the firm can makeextra
money only through expanding quantities (as long as the average
incremental costs ofexpansion are below the price level).
In principie, the same incentiveswithpremia and penalties would
hold for the case of simple variable fees that are set ex ante. The
TRANSCO would set those in such a way that the existing transmission
capacity is optimally utilized. Foregone loads and load shedding mean
reduced revenues. Pricing responses to avoid these reductions go in
the same direction as under spot pricing (only less responsive) and the
compensating changes in fixed fees are similar.
4.3.3. Fixed fees
Fixed fees fuiflil several functions. In particular, they help pay for the
difference betweentotal costs andvariable fees. Althoughvariable fees
could cover total costs, it would be pure coincidence if they did so
efficiently. Prudent capacity reserve margins, for example, could for
ce efficient variable prices far below cost-covering levels. Fixed fees
could also pay for backup transmission capacity for customers ordi
narily bypassing the grid of a TRANSCO. Pérez-Arriaga et al. (1996)
contend that variable fees at marginal costs would pay substantially
less than total costs.
Fixed fees will have to be discriminatory in the sense that differ
ent customers pay different amounts of fixed fees.’° Otherwise, large
customers wouid be heavily favored. Fixed fees should fulfihl at least
two requirements. They should be fair (subsidy-free) and they should
not depend directly on individual usage. If they depended on usage
they would not be fixed but rather variable. What they should depend
on is the transmission capacity cost caused by a customer andlor the
customer’s net benefit derived from the network’s use. The range
between capacity costs caused by the customer and customer benefit
(both net of variable contributions) would define fixed fees that are
free of (cross-) subsidies. A proxy within this range could be total
generating capacity or load of a user connected to the grid (the size of
10 However, they need not to be discriminatory in the sense that they result in different
average prices paid by different customers.
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the fuse).” More efficient (less distortionary) but harder to determine
would be fixed fees proportional to net benefits.
4.3.4. Weights ofthe Price-cap Index
Besides the immediate penalties/premia created by the within-period
adjustments forced by the price-cap constraint there is a between-pe
riod (annual) adjustment due to the dynamic nature of the formula.
This between-period adjustment depends on the precise formula used
for determining weights ofthe price-cap index. As shown below for a
stylized example, the more (relative) weights deviate from optimal
quantities the more will the outcome deviate from the optimal out
come. Thus, it is important to set price structures approximatelyright
in the initial period sothat convergence to optimal prices does not take
too long.
The most important weights in use or discussed in the litera-
ture are:
1) Quantities of the previous period (chained Laspeyres price
index)
2) Quantities ofthe current period (Paasche weights)
3) Weights that are fixed over time (fixed Laspeyres weights)
4) Projected quantities (Laffont-Tirole weights)
5) Flexible weights (resulting in an average revenue constraint)
1) The most common formula in actual price-cap regulation uses
quantities ofthe previous period as weights (chained Laspeyres price
index). These weights have substantial advantages. They are easily
verifiable and usually close to the optimal weights. Also, the change
in profits resulting from these weights is usually smaller than the
change in welfare. Their drawback is that, in times ofmajor demand
and cost changes, they can differ substantially from optimal weights,
has to be careful, though, not to create perverse incentives. For example, if such a
fixed fee would prevent a generating company from building a power plant, then this may
actually increase transmission congestion and may increase the required transmission capacity.
Thus, additional generation capacity may appear to contribute negatively to transmission costs.
In this sense, generation and transmission can be substitutos. Theimportant issue is to minimize
the sum of transmission, generation and distribution costs for given electricity consumption.
resulting in suboptimal prices aiid output leveis. However, once costs
and demand stabilize, these weights converge to optimal weights.
2) Paasche weights, which use current quantities, usually have
the problemthat quantities are not knownbefore the end ofthe period,
meaningthat allowed prices would also be known at that point in time
only. However, ifvariable prices simply reflect congestion they would
be determined by the market and the resultingweights would be used
only to determine fixed fees. Even if this solves feasibility problems,
Paasche weights do not have very desirable properties. In particular,
there is no intrinsic tendency to converge to optimalweights over time.
Also, the change in profits resulting from these weights is usually
larger than the change in welfare. This may have to be countered by
a largerX factor.
3) While fixed weights are not subject to manipulation, their
problern is that they do not adjust to changing circuinstances and are
therefore often far off from optimal weights.
4) Predicted quantities as weights are optimal to the extent that
the predictions are correct. However, ifdemanded quantities expand, the
change in profits resulting frorn these weights is usually larger than
the change in welfare. This may require a largerXfactor to compensate.
Contrary to the other weights discussed so far, determining these
weights requires sophisticated analysis by the regulator. We discuss
thern below in connection with global price caps (Section 5.3.2).
5) Average revenue constraints have the advantage of extreme
sirnplicity. However, they contain a certain arbitrariness (that they
share with fully distributed cost pricing). In order to define an average
revenue total revenue has to be divided by a single type of quantity
units. For example, for an electricity generation or transmission
company the most obvious unit would be kWh, masking differences in
voltage leveis, reliability, time of day, location, etc. Because of this
arbitrariness it is hard to know how far the resulting weights differ
from optimal weights. As shown by Sappington and Sibley (1992),
average revenue constraints could create incentives to introduce inef
ficient forms oftwo-part tariffs.
Although previous quantities are not optimal, they probably
strike a balance between practicality and efficiency. Below, we try to
show that lagged weights provide good operating and investment
incentives. The alternative would be to set sorne fixed benchmark
weights, based on ideal capacity utilization.
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4.4. A Simple Model
4.4.1. The Price-cap Constraint
We will now formalize the price-cap constraint and derive sorne
properties through simple profit maximization.
Assume that the firm faces a price-cap constraint based on the
average of prices it charges. In this case, the average is defined by a
price index over two-part tariffs. The subscripts of fixed fees (the F’s)
run over ah potential consumersj,j = 1,.. . , N, reflecting discrimi
nation in fixed fees. The subscripts ofusage fees (thep’s) can run over
sub-periods, nodes, voltage levels, etc., ah covered by i, i = 1,. .. , fil.
The quantities (the q’s) corresponding to usage fees could be kWh (or
sorne other unit for ancillary services). Summation is over i’s andj’s.
Superscripts refer to periods (years). We neglect price uncertainty
with an ex post determination of fixed fees.’ 2
The price-cap constraint verbally described in the previous sec
tion would, in period t, have the form:
+ EF 6w (,Zp t -11 q° +
-‘,6) (1 — X)
j Ji
(Epqv +F-’, 6 ) (1 —X).
Here,6 is either ‘O’ or ‘1’, depending on whether aparticular firm
j is a subscriber at the time. In more compact vector presentation we
can write the price cap as
(pqD + P&u)/(p-lqL + P-’ 6w) (1 —X),
with p an lxM vector, q an Mxl, F an lxN, and 6 an Nxl vector. For
the moment, we neglect ‘X’ and set it to zero. This brings out more
clearly the basic tradeoffs involved. Also, assume that tariffs are such
that within realistic pricing options the number ofcustomers is fixed.
In the simplest case of a given number ofusers, N, and only one
usage charge and one fixed fee, equations (1) and (la) can be re
duced to:
where A signifies change.
F’ F t - 1 +
(J3t1 _pt)qw/N.
(2a) shows nicely how fixed and variable fees can be traded off
against each other. The trade offfactor is the ratio between the output
weight and the number ofcustomers.
Now, for the simple case, consider the firm’s objective function in
the short run:
max it =p t q t +N — C (qt,K t ) s.t. (2) and s.t. q t K.
We assume a simple cost function C (qt, K) = C (q t , Kt1) for
q tK’ and C (qt, K) = C(q,K t - 1 )Jt for q t >K’, with Jt = q t —Kg’.
This reflects the long-run and sunk nature ofthe transmission grid.’ 3
Thus, costs only change through the addition ofnew capacity.
The first-order condition of (3) with respect top t under binding
constraints (witht t as the Lagrange multiplier of the capacity con-
straint) is:
(aqt/apt) (,jt +t
— aC/aqt) = qW
—q t .





where e is the demand elasticity.
Sorne results can be shown fairly easily, assuming the absence of
strategic behavior by the TRÁNSCO (or by large customers) to influence
the price-cap formula:
12 Such ex post adjustment could involve interest charges, strategizing on discrimination
and the effects that differences between before/after prices could have on the number of
customers (generators, distribution companies and final users).
13 C(qt, Kt 1) = o would reflect the sunk nature ofthe grid. Our formulation includes this
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1) In times of excess capacity and stationary demand functions,
usage fees will decrease, usage will increase and there will be no
investment. The reason is that a decrease in usage charges leads to an
increase in fixed fees that together generate an increase in total
revenues. Since, with excess capacity, there is no cost increase formore
usage, net profits must increase.
2) In times of binding capacity constraints the usage charge
equals the users’ marginal willingness-to-pay. This says that we have
ruled out non-price rationing. Thus, in this case, the usage charge is
a pure congestion charge.
3) If congestion charges on the margin are higher than the
marginal costs of adding capacity the firm will have an incentive to
add capacity.
The strength ofthe investment incentive (and ofthe incentive to
lower usage prices) depends on the weights ofthe price index used. If
the price-cap is a Laspeyres index (with last period’s quantities as
weights) the incentives are such that the TRANSCO will not invest the
fuil difference between the status quo capacity and the optimal capac
ity. The reason is that the firm faces a trade offbetween making extra
money on usage (congestion) and the amount it can make byincreasing
fixed fees. The latter is restricted by the weights on usage and fixed
fees. For a given number of customers the firm faces a “residual
demand curve” similar to the case of a Cournot oligopolist. In Figure
1, this is the demand curve D starting from quantityq t -’. This is
because a change in the variable fee transiates into a change in the
fixed fee that, applied to last period’s quantity, exactly equals the price
change. Thus, any profit change resulting from a change in the vari
able fee applies only to the change in quantity, starting from q t
-‘. As
a result, the firm will behave like a monopolist on the “residual
demand curve” (except that its marginal cost curve starts at zero
quantity). Thus, the firm will want to invest if customer willingness
to pay exceeds marginal cost of investment but will not invest to the
point where the two are equal. Rather, investment will proceed over
time and (with stationary cost and demand functions) converge to the
optimum capacity. This is a conjecture based on earlier work ofmine
on this type of scheme (Vogelsang, 1989. See also Bertoletti and
Poletti, 1997).
Note that (2) with last period’s quantities as weights describes a
Slutsky-type approximation to the total consumer surplus change. The




mechanism is therefore an approximation to the Loeb-Magat scheme
(Loeb and Magat, 1979). Only ifweights correspond to the quantities
traded in the optimal state will investment be optimal as well. This
conjecture follows from the Laffont and Tirole price cap approach
(Laffont and Tirole, 1993). It obviously holds for the case of myopic
profit maximization. To see this, consider the first-order condition (4).
In contrast, the corresponding condition for social surpius maximiza
tion would have zero on the right hand side. Now assume weights
equal to the socially optimal quantity, q*, at which customer willing
ness-to-pay equals marginal cost. Figure 2 depicts this case. The firm’s
“residual demand curve” would now start at q*, and there would be no
incentive to move to another quantity.
The problem ofusing optimal weights is how to determine them
without going through the motions of sophisticated regulation. Since,
as can be seen from Figure 2, using optimal weights provides an
opportunity for the regulatedfirm to earn at leastthe increase in social
surpius, it should be possible to design a mechanism to make the firm
reveal the optimal weights. Analogous mechanisms with a similar
objective include the ISS-R by Sibley (1989).’ Under this mechanism,
14 For a slightly different mechanism in the same spirit, see Vogelsang (1990).
rMcI
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the regulated firm would be able to offer an optional two-part tariff
along with last period’s tariff. Thus, customers can always choose last
period’s tariff. The optional tariffmustthereforemake them at least as
well off. Thus, the firm maximizes profit w.r.t. the optional two-part
tariffunderthe constraintthat consumers get a specified surpius. The
optimal variable fee then equals marginal cost and the fixed fee takes
away the consumer surpius increase.
As discussed aboye, fixed fees proportional to transmissioncapac
ity costs caused by a user could be approximately efficient. Ifwe find
such a proportionality factor (for example, generation capacity con
nected to the grid) we can use a capacity charge instead of the fixed
fee and use the proportionality factor as the quantity of capacity
“consumed”. This proportionality factor would then be the basis for
quantity weights ofwhat we have termed the fixed fee (instead ofthe
6’s). If the proportionality factor is exact the firm would have strong
incentives to expand capacity optimally.
We have, so far, only considered myopic profit maximization of
the firm. In a fully dynamic setting with maximization ofa discounted
stream óffuture profits and with changing cost and demand functions
things become more complicated and less predictable. If capacity
expansion is required we can safely conjecture that capacity will
converge to an optimal level as long as cost and demand functions do
not shift over time (Vogelsang, 1989). This would hoid only for expan
sion, since we had assumed that capacity cannot contract. We also
know that changing demand and cost functions can cause problems,
because the speed ofadaptation ofprice-cap mechanisms is restricted
by the speed ofchange in weights.’ 5
44.2. The Effect ofX on the Investment Incentive
Provided that the input price adjustment factors correctly trace the
TRANSCO’s input price developments the initial price level and the X
factor jointly determine the TRANSCO’S price level relative to average
(and marginal) costs. Ifthe firm’s initial price level does not cover the
average incremental cost ofexpansion there will, at least initially, be
little incentive to invest.’ 6 Thus, setting the initial price level below
average incremental cost ofexpansion would conflict with investment
incentives and would therefore work well only ifno immediate invest
ment is required. Since we want to bring out investment incentives,
we assume that expansion through investment would be optimal and
that the initial price level exceeds the average incremental costs of
expansion. In order to preserve incentives to invest,Xcan, in the long
run, not exceed the firm’s productivity growth on new investment.
Suchproductivitygrowthwould come from (a) more efficient operation
due to better incentives, (b) technical progress, and (c) economies of
scale effects.
The precise investment effects depend on the forward-looking
difference between price level and average incremental costs ofexpan
sion. This difference is captured largely inX. Increasingthe difference
(decreasingX) has two effects (assumingthat the difference is positive
and belowthe unconstrained monopoly level). First, a larger difference
makes investments more profitable, leading to increased investment
incentives. Second, a larger difference means a higher price, which
15 For demand changes, see Nen (1993); for cost changes, see Fraser (1995). Sappington
and Sibley (1992) show that there may be a strategic incentive to use (inefficient) two-parttariffs
ifthe price-cap is in the form ofan average revenue constraint. This differs from our case where
the twopart tariffs are part ofthe price-cap.
1 The regulator could force such investment by imposing penalties for deteriorating
quality ofservice outside the price-cap constraint but that would be outside the approach taken
in this paper.
MCI
q t - t q*qt
30 31Ingo Vogelsang Optimal PriceRegulation for Natural and Legal Monopolies
decreases the demanded quantity. Under linear pricing and under
pure price rationing, the second effect dominates. This means that,
without non-price rationing, investment would increase in X as long
as the new price level stays below average incremental cost ofexpan
sion (Cabral and Riordan, 1989). Under our two-parttariffscheme this
does not necessarily hoid. As long as the number of customers is not
affected by the fixed fee, the same variable fee stays optimal for the
firm. We can see this by adapting (2) to the case ofX O. Then (2)
As can be seen, a change ofXin this constraint does not affect the
first-order condition (4). The investment incentive in the short run
would therefore be unaffected by changes in X, as long as investment
remains profitable. In contrast, it appears that long-run dynamic
investment incentives could be affected.
The market for transmission services may be dominated by a single
customer. This would, for example, hoid ifthe TRANSCO was originally
split off from a vertically integrated electric utility, whose set of
generation plants is unaifected by the vertical separation. A dominant
customer could try to exercise monopsony power andlor raise rivais’
costs. As indicated aboye, raising rivais’ costs can be addressed by
price-cap baskets and by rules governing optional pricing. Monopsony
power expresses itself in less purchases, in order to get lower prices.
This could onlywork to the extent that a reduction inpurchases lowers
the dominant customer’s average transmission prices. 17 That, how
ever, would be largely precluded by the two-part tariff price-cap
scheme. On the contrary, if the TRANSCO mimics the price-cap con
straint in the tariff for the dominant purchaser average price paid
would increase, as purchases are reduced.
However, for two reasons large generators may actually want to
reduce transmissions. The first reason is to reduce transmissionprices
17 We are here neglecting the possibility that the dominant purchaser may have market
power in the market for electricity generation.
over the long run by reducing the usage weights and usage prices. The
second reason is to keep the transmission network small, thereby
reducing competition in generation. The first reason is unlikely to
work, because average price is likely to increase in spite of lower
weights on usage. The second reason may require collusion to be
effective, because otherwise small generators could free-ride on this
strategy. It could also be counter-acted by making distribution com
panies and industrial customers buy transmission services unbundled
from generation.
According to Green (1997) transrnission pricing should fulfihi six
sensible principles. They are:
1) Efficient day-to-day operation ofthe bulk power market.
2) Efficient investment in the transmission system.
3) Signaling oflocational advantages for generation and distribu
tion investments.
4) (Historie) cost recovery oftransmission assets.
5) Sirnplicity and transparency.
6) Political feasibility.
We have concentrated our discussion on the first two of these
principles, which our price-cap seheme with two-part tariffs should
fulfill. Included in these two principles is the quality of service. Our
incentive regulation proposal relies largely on the ‘rINsco’s profit in
centive to provide quality of service. Bad quality in the form of
congestion, for example, wouid either lead to high variable fees that
would be penalized through lower fixed fees. Or it would lead to
foregone sales. However, the price-cap scherne rnay not take care ofah
quality dirnensions and, to the extent that price caps constrain profits,
there may exist incentives to reduce costs by reducing sorne quahity
attributes. To prevent this, quality incentives, standards and cornrnit
ments rnay need to be added to the regulatory scheme, for example, in
order to prevent poor ancillary services and outages.
In order to achieve principie 3 (optimal location of generation
capacity), the TRANSCO would either have to set predictable variable
fees and fixed fees that directly relate to transmission capacity costs
becornes:
F (1 —X)F’ + [(1 —X)p’ _ptjqw/N. (2’)
4.5. Conclusion on Transmission Prices
4.4.3. Market Power ofGenerators as Users ofTransmission Lines
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caused by new generatiori/distribution capacity or would have to
engage in long-term contracting with its customers. Both ofthese are
feasible under the proposed scheme but not automatic parts ofit. The
suggested regulatory approach is definitely compatible with stable
average prices that would signal transmission investment costs in
curred by customers. 18 In addition, the approach can also be imple
mented through contracts (as options or as part oftariffs). For exam
pie, custorners could buy interruptible service at lower fixed fees or firm
services at higher fixed fees (and, possibly lower or vanishing variable
fees). Ah this could be done within the price-cap constraint. Contract
ing could also be used by customers as the basis for becomingresellers.
Principie 4 (cost recovery) can be achieved through initial rates
that reflect embedded investment costs. In this case, the X factor
would have to account for the difference between embedded average
costs and forward-iooking incremental costs. If embedded ayer
age costs exceed forward-looking incremental costs X should be posi
tive, forcing the firm to reduce its costs .through investment. Vice
versa, if embedded average costs are below forward-looking incre
mental costs, X should be negative.
Principie 5 (simplicity and transparency) is in the eyes of the
beholder, Cleariy, the regulatory mechanism has to be based on
transparent data. The level of complexity of actual tariffs depends
on the trade off between efficiency and cornpiexity that market par
ticipants and regulators are willing to make. Since participants in the
transmission market are iargely sophisticated firms, simplicity would
have less value here than in the retail market for electricity.
Principie 6 requires that no interest group invoived is made
noticeabiy worse off. It is closely linked with principies 4 and 5.
Principie 4 assures that the TRANSCO is not made worse off. In addition,
basing initial rates on historic costs and choosingX carefuliy assures
that generators, industrial users and distribution companies receive
services on average at better than status quo prices. However, that
does not necessarily mean that ah ofthern are better off. First, better
transmission can intensify competition between generators, thus re
ducing profits of sorne of them. Second, more sophisticated pricing
means that former cross-subsidies may be eliminated.
18 It is actually not clear that individual customers need stable transmission prices.
Variable spot prices, for example, are Iikely to reflect variable conditions ofcustomers and may
actually reduce swings in customers’ earnings.
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To the six principies for transmission pricing proposed in Green
(1997) a seventh, reguiatory, principie should be added. It is that
regulation shouid not stand in the way ofinnovative pricingbymarket
participants. This means that the regulatory price mechanism should
be flexible enough to accornmodate both simple and sophisticated
transmission tariffs. This is something the aboye mechanism was
designed to do.
5. Vertical Integration of Generation
and Transmission
5.1. The Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR)
Reguiation of transmission pricing differs between a TRANSCO and an
integrated generation and transmission company rnainly because
other electricity generators using the transmission grid compete with
the integrated firm. Thus, the transmissiongrid is an essential facility
(or bottieneck input) suppiied to these independent generators by a
competitor (who may also be the dominant generator).
Recent years have seen substantial dispute among economists
about regulated pricing ofbottleneck inputs soid to competitors. The
pricing rule most hotly discussed in the literature is known as the
efficient component pricing rule (ECPR).’° It says the integrated com
pany shouid charge a transmission price equal to the incremental
resource costs oftransmission plus the so-caiied “opportunity cost” of
transmission. This opportunity cost is the foregone profit contribution
ofthe integrated company by providing transmission to a competitor
who might use transmission to displace generation services provided
by the integrateci company. Thus, the ECPR is driven by the integrated
company’s wholesale eiectricity prices. If(a) transmission and whole-
sale eiectricity are generated in fixed proportions and if (b) the inte
grated company’s and the independent generators’ wholesaie electric
ity are perfect substitutes, and if (c) generators take the integrated
company’s price of the cornpeting wholesale electricity as given, then
the opportunity cost is simply the profit contribution or quasi-rent
19 The ECPR is widely attributed to Willig (1979) and Baumo) (1983). For an extensive
discussion, see Baumol and Sidak, 1994 and the Winter 1994 edition of The Yate Journal on
Regulation and in the FaIl 1995 issue ofthe Antitrust Bulletin.
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generated by the integrated company’s wholesale electricity (simple
ECPR). Otherwise, the opportunity cost may be a fairly complicated
term, reflecting cross-elasticities ofwholesale electricity between dif
ferent vendors, technical substitution and types of competition (so
phisticated EcPR). The sophisticated version would apply to the rela
tionship between electricity generation and transmission where, for
example, (a) does not hoid.
The main peculiarity in approach taken by the proponents ofthe
ECPR is the assumption that the price for the wholesale electricity
would be given (and chosen optimally) and that the only function of
competitive entry is to provide part of generation at lower cost than
the integrated company. The ECPR is therefore a partial rule that deals
onlywith a specific aspect ofelectricity pricing and competition. It has
nevertheless proven to be highly policy relevant. The reasons are that,
with the simple version ofopportunity cost:
• It is easily understood and practiced,
• It is often embraced by incumbents,
• It does not require achange in (regulated) prices offinal services
and does not interfere with politically popular cross subsidies.
With the more sophisticated version ofopportunity costs the ECPR
is also theoretically quite attractive but much more demanding on the
regulator (see Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers, 1996).
The simple version of the ECPR is formally very similar to the
requirement of imputation. Imputation means that the integrated
firm maynot price transmission at a lower price to itselfthan to others.
Imputation is imposed in order to eliminate foreclosure incentives of
the integrated company’s simultaneous pricing in the transmission
market and in the wholesale electricity markets. Because internal
prices, in contrast to external transaction prices, do not usually have
direct allocative effects (because internal payments cancel each other
out), they can be used only as an accounting device to discover
cross-subsidies. The imputation requirement shall thus guarantee
that the wholesale electricitystage is not cross-subsidized. Laffont and
Tirole (1996) equate the imputation requirement with the ECPR. How
ever, imputation implies upper bounds for transmission charges (or
minimal internal transfer p ices), while the ECPR declares these upper
bounds to be optimal.
5.2. Ramsey Prices
Theoretically optimal transmission prices can be determined under
the Ramsey pricing approach taken by Laffont and Tirole (1993 and
1994). This approach simultaneously determines optimal transmis
sion and electricity prices, and it makes no apriori assumptions about
demand relationships, technology and type ofcompetition. Rather, the
assumptions vary, like in oligopoly models in general. Depending on
which assumptions are made, the approach leads to different results.
In general, these results are complex in that they have to deal with
the integrated company’s budget constraint, demand relationships,
cost relationships and types of competition. This complexity reflects
complicated relationships that need to be dealt with and is the price
to be paid for general rather than partial optimization.
For example, a model by Masmoudi and Prothais (1994) on
telecommunications would yield transmission prices with the follow
ing components:
• The marginal cost oftransmission.
• A Ramsey markup including market shares of generators and
the type of competitive interaction between them.
• A differential efficiency term reflecting the difference in effi
ciency between the integrated generator and the independent
generators. This term has two opposing components: The more
efficient an independent generator, the more it should produce
relative to the incumbent, thus the lowerthetransmissionprice.
Conversely, the more stringent the integrated firm’s budget
constraint, the less weight is given to the entrant’s efficiency.
• Atransmission charge elasticityterm relatingthe transmission
charge to the entrant’s electricity output. The less elastic this
output is to the transmission charge the higher the transmis
sion charge should be.
Also, the optimal electricity prices themselves would obey a
complicated markup formula. In reality, a regulator cannot hope to
capture al! these effects at the same time. 2 °
20 These effects do not yet include incentive effects as discussed in Laffont and Tirole
(1993). The absence ofincentive effects can be justified ifthe incentive-pricing dichotomy holds.
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5.3. Price-Caps
5.3.1. Price-Cap Options
Information about the relevant technological and demand properties
necessary to derive Ramsey prices or the ECPR is either unavailable or
squarely rests with the integrated company. This makes it virtually
impossible to directly implernent the Ramsey approach and the ECPR.
One could argue that asymmetric or lacking information can be
captured in Bayesian incentive schemes using subjective probability
distributions. However, such schemes lose much of their power if
uncertainty parameters are too vague and too many. Thus, we take
the same price-cap approach to the integrated firm as we did to the
TRANSCO. However, in addition we have to take care of the different
markets fortransmission and wholesale electricity and ofthe relation
ship between the two. This gives us four options to consider:
1) Global price-caps that include transmission pricing and elec
tricity pricing in a single approach (the same basket).
2) Separate price-caps (baskets) for the transmission and genera
tion markets.
3) Price-caps for generation, but no price-caps for transmission.
4) Price.caps for transmission, but no price-caps for generation.
5.3.2. Global Price-Caps
Laffont and Tirole (1994 and 1996) have made a strong case for global
price-caps. They argue that making the integrated firm choose its
overali price structure under a common constraint on the price level
can align the incentive for optimal pricing in both markets. They do,
however, assume that the price-cap index uses optimal weights to begin
with. In addition, they want to reduce any incentives for anticompeti
tive behavior by imposing an imputation rule for transmission pricing
in addition to the price-caps. Thus, any individual transmission prices
would have to obey both the price-cap and the imputation rules.
Under global price-caps a condition like (4) aboye holds. Thus,
optimal weights would be the correctly predicted output leveis. Mak
ing such predictions looks doable for a regulator. However, it actually
means solving the Ramsey pricing problem discussed aboye. This
would be very hard and would make the use ofprice-caps superfluous
because, by solvingthe problem, the regulatorwould know the Ramsey
prices and therefore could prescribe them directly. Thus, in applying
global price-caps one will probablyhave to compromise onweightsthat
are either quantities ofpast periods or quantities projected from past
trends. TheXfactor would have tobe derived from a weighted average
ofproductivity increases for transmission and generation.
In theory, global price-caps provide the integrated firm with the
ability and incentive to generate Ramsey prices overaiL The imputa
tion requirement may reduce this ability but that would only be in
those cases where Ramsey prices would imply market foreclosure of
rivais. Nevertheless, global price-caps may be too boid for a regulator
to implement. One reason is that it is common knowledge that the
regulator cannot commit to a specific regulatory scheme in the long
run. Thus, under global price-caps, the integrated firm may use
aggressive tactics against rivals, in order to keep its overali market
position, in case regulation changes in the future.
5.3.3. Separate Price-Caps
From the regulator’s perspective, separate price-caps are less daring
and therefore more acceptable than global price-caps. There would be
a transmission price-cap like the one described in Section 4 aboye and
a wholesale electricity price-cap. The latter would be restricted to the
integrated firm, while independent generators would be free to set
their prices. 21 The wholesale price cap could be quite similar in spirit
to the transmission price cap. A two-part tariffscheme here would be
equally compelling. Since transmission services are inputs for whole
sale electricity, there should be apassthrough oftransmission charges.
This could also be used for imputation purposes.
Having separate price-caps for wholesale electricity and trans
mission is theoretically non-optimal because the separation restricts
the integrated firm’s freedom to rebalance prices between transmis
sion and generation. However, just like separate price-cap baskets
they provide the regulator with additional controls.
21 In my view, regulation should be asymmetric, as long as the integrated firm is clearly
dominating the market. Once that is no longer the case, one should deregulate the integrated
firm rather than regulate the independent generators.
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5.3.4. Price-Caps for Generation Only
Since electricity generation is more competitive than transmission, it
may seem awkward to regulate generation but not transmission ofthe
dorninant integrated firm. One could here use the argument ofpropo
nents of the ECPR that voluntary negotiations between the integrated
firrn and the independent generator would automatically lead to the
ECPR. 22 Thus, if wholesale electricity rates were regulated optimally,
the ECPR would result in transmission charges that could be optimal.
There are two problems with this. The first is that optimal regulation
of generation is not guaranteed. In particular, the regulator usually
cannot commit to a regulatory scherne that would leave profits ofthe
integrated firm intact after it lost a lot ofmarket share in generation.
Second, bykeepingtransmission capacity small (bycharginghigh
transrnission fees) the integrated firrn can influence the type of com
petition in electricity generation and the investments of competing
generators. Thus, bydeviating frorn the ECPR, the integrated firm could
try to prevent competition in generation from happening.
Regulating generation but not regulating transmission seems to
have it the wrong way round. This holds, in particular, because
transmission is the key to competition in the electricity sector.
5.3.5. Price-Caps for Transrnission Only
While generation will not be perfectly competitive, entry into genera
tion has become easier and economies ofscale are less pronouncedthan
in the past. In contrast, transrnission is likely to keep monopoly advan
tages for sorne time. As a consequence, transrnission and wholesale
electricity can be sufficiently separated so that (for sorne time) trans
mission can be regulated while the wholesale electricity services pro
duced with transrnission as an input can be left to market competition.
Price-caps for transmission would be similar to those described
in Section 4 aboye. In addition, there would be the need for an
irnputation rule for the integrated firrn not to seli transrnission to itself
at a lower price than to independent generators.
1 conjecture that under any separate regulation of transmission
pricing the wholesale electricity prices resulting under competition
will ex post yield the ECPR (in the sense that the transmission
charge will equal the incremental cost of transmission plus the fore
gone profit contribution). This is trivial for hornogeneous Bertrand
competition. In cases ofheterogeneous goods and other types of corn
petition it would mean that the incumbent would expand in the
wholesale electricity market up to the point where the marginal profit
contribution from more wholesale electricity sales equals that from
more sales to independent generators. Thus, the ECPR is conjectured
to appear as an equilibrium result of competition rather than as a
starting point of transmission price setting by an incumbent with
market power. 23
Restricting regulation to transmission, while leaving generation
virtually unregulated, is certainly bolder than having (separate) regu
lation for both stages. However, both approaches appear to be work
able.
6. Conclusions
We have suggested a price-cap approach for independent transmission
companies. This approach would be implernented for two-part tariffs
where the variable part would reflect congestion charges, power losses
and other ancillary services while the fixed part would reflect capacity
costs. The firm would then have incentives to trade off congestion
against capacity expansion in such a way that it becomes profitable to
expand, whenever the costs of congestion on average exceed the costs
ofexpansion. With sensible parametervalues the scheme should fulfill
the six principles identified by Green (1997) for the design oftrans
mission prices.
For integrated generation and transmission cornpanies facing
competition in generation we suggest either separate price-caps for
generation and transmission or only price-caps for transmission,
with generation unregulated (only subject to antitrust laws). In either
case, an irnputation rule would be added, assuring that the integrated
22 This is not strictly true. In a bilateral negotiation over transmission services between
the integrated firm and an independent generator the ECPR would be the integrated firm’s threat
point, while the independent generator’s threat point would be not to operate. If there is any
room for negotiation the integrated firm will deviate from the ECPR.
23 first published this conjecture in Vogelsang (1996). Stronger statements have been
made by Tye, who maintainsthat the ECPR will always result expost. To the best ofmy knowledge
no general proof ofthe proposition has appeared in the literature.
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company charges transmission to itselfat the same rates available to
outsiders.
The price-cap schemes discussed for electricity transmission can
be easily adapted to the regulation of natural gas and oil pipeline
companies. Complications could arise from the fact that oil and gas
are substitutes in demand and complements in supply. Simpler ver
sions ofprice-caps could hoid for gas or electricity distribution compa
nies. In the latter two cases the price adjustment should be based on
general inflation, and the X factor should include the difference
between expected inflation and those items not covered by an input
price adjustment factor.
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